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probabilities in the records of the Dutch foreign policy 
decisions. When Gallhofer and Saris coded the verbal 
expressions of probability and utility in these accounts, 
they found an expression of the intensity of both the 
probability and the utility in only 3 of 235 decisions. 
Their set of seven decision rules was sufficient to match 
all but 8 of the 235 decisions, but the SEU strategy 
was among the least popular of the seven. 
Every decision making research group should have 
and use a copy of the book, and it will be worthwhile 
in graduate students' reading. The publisher should be 
faulted for the excessive number of typographical errors 
in some of the later chapters. 
ROBERT M. HAMM 
Department of Psychology. 
L'niversit,v of Coloruclo. Boulder, Colorado, USA. 
THINKING A N D  DECIDING. Jonathan Baron. 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Jonathan Baron's Tliitikitig utid D ~ i d i t i g  is all about 
good thinking and poor thinking. The author suggests 
that all goal-directed thinking and decision making can 
he described in terms of a secrrc~h-it!feretice Jrcit?ieisork. 
That is. thinking can be described as inferences made 
from possibilities. evidence. and goals that are dis- 
covered through searching. This framework is both 
descriptive and prescriptive. It defines poor thinking 
as ignoring possibilities. evidence. and goals that should 
be considered and as making inferences biased toward 
preserving favored ideas and beliefs. What is needed 
ti) overcome poor thinking is active open-mindedness. 
Clearly this book is not simply a survey but reflects 
a point of view. 
The author defines thinking as a method of choosing 
among potential possibilities where possibilities might 
consist of actions. beliefs or personal goals. These 
choices are based on a search for relevant information 
and the inferences which are made from the information 
obtained. Information is broadly defined to include 
goals, choices, and evidence. Choices are evaluated on 
the basis of evidence in light of the goals. For example. 
an undergraduate student having the goal of achieving 
good grades might rate a course more favorably upon 
hearing that the average grade in the course is a B. 
Whether or not taking this course is a good idea might 
depend upon how superficial the search process was. 
With further search the student might discover that 
he or she also has the goal of learning something and 
obtain evidence that the course will fail to satisfy this 
goal. or the student might uncover an alternativecourse 
where the average grade is an A. Furthermore. the 
student might determine that although the average 
grade is ;i B. the only students who take the course 
have a natural talent for it .  a talent that this hypo- 
thetical student might lack. Thinking may also be in- 
effective if initial ideas bias the search for information 
or if the search process is too extensive in relation to 
the importance of a question. Buying a hamburger 
should not  involve a more thorough search than buying 
ri house. 
The above analysis ofthinking focuses on inadequate 
search as the cause of poor thinking. Dr Baron does 
point out, however, that without knowledge. thinking 
is an 'empty shell.' Because thinking involves search, 
there must be some contents for the search to operate 
on. 
The author provides a notion of rationality in keep- 
ing with his emphasis on goals as organizing search. 
The best kind of thinking, rational thinking, is 'what- 
ever helps fulfill our personal goals.' Thus violations 
of the laws of logic and self-deception could, in prin- 
ciple, help fulfill goals and thereby satisfy this definition 
of rationality. 
The book is organized into four main sections. The 
first section covers general topics concerning thinking 
and includes chapters on problem solving, simple and 
complex learning. intelligence. creativity, formal logic. 
and everyday reasoning. The second section focuses 
on probability and belief and provides chapters on 
normative theories of probability, descriptive theories 
of probability judgement, hypothesis testing. correla- 
tion and contingency, and biases and beliefs. The third 
section covers normative and descriptive theories of 
utility and choice, quantitative judgement (lens model, 
impression formation, adding and averaging models), 
moral thinking, social dilemmas and decisions about 
the future. Notably, the author's prescriptive point of 
view extends to moral thinking where he argues against 
relativism and in favor of a utilitarianism that aims 
to maximize expected utility (good) for everyone. The 
book concludes with a chapter on the teaching of think- 
ing and decision making. 
The book is intended for advanced undergraduates 
or beginning graduate students taking a course on 
decision making and thinking. More broadly. the book 
is for 'anyone who is disturbed by poor thinking.' 
How well does the book succeed in realizing the 
author's goals'? Very well, in my opinion. Each of the 
chapters is densely packed and never boring. Although 
the coverage is broad, depth has not been sacrificed. 
I liked too many of the chapters to single out favorites 
but here is a small sample of my positive reactions. 
The chapter on intelligence provides a nice debunking 
of IQ as ilir true measure of intelligence. The chapter 
on formal logic presents a clear and thoughtful review 
in less that 20 pages of text. I did not anticipate that 
there was much to  be said about creativity from the 
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perspective of the book’s goals but was very pleasantly 
surprised by the author’s treatment. Insightful ex- 
amples and comments truly are too numerous to 
mention and they range from bringing out the virtues 
of incorrect mental models or theories to pointing to 
instances where psychologists themselves ignore base 
rate information in interpreting their results. 
Everyone can generate topics that should have been, 
but were not, included. I would have liked to see much 
more from the areas of social cognition and cross- 
cultural studies of thinking (to be fair, neither topic 
was ignored). 
The way in which the book is perhaps most successful 
is in conveying a point of view. The search-inference 
framework does work for both descriptive analyses and 
the prescriptive conclusions. What comes across is not 
simply a textbook, but rather a person, Jonathon 
Baron, who is thinking and deciding about thinking 
and deciding. And following his own advice, the author 
almost always provides a balanced treatment of his 
material. 
My only strong reaction within the framework of 
the author’s goals concerns the sections on moral think- 
ing. He argues for an universal rather than relativisitic 
view of moral judgements and for a form of utilitarian- 
ism that defines best actions as those that have the 
highest expected utility across people. He says, ‘If it 
is wrong for me to steal a book from the library, then 
it is wrong for you too, if you are in the same situation.’ 
I have difficulty seeing how universalism follow’s from 
the rest of Baron’s framework. If ‘situation’ includes 
personal goals and utilities, then it may be very unlikely 
that two people are in the same situation. Furthermore, 
who can determine what the utilities are? It goes against 
the spirit of the book to argue that society must impose 
utilities but if individuals are allowed to supply the 
utilities, then there will be utility in exaggerating one’s 
own needs, wants and goals. 
Maximizing expected utility across all people is just 
one of many options and a potentially dangerous one 
at that. Richard Atkinson (American Psychologist, 
1972, 27, 921-931) provides an insightful discussion of 
alternative to maximizing expected utilities in employ- 
ing computer-aided instruction effectively. He notes 
that maximizing the mean performance over all 
students may have the undesirable consequence of put- 
ting disadvantaged children still further behind the 
more advantaged children. Alternatively, one might 
aim to minimize the variance in performance or to max- 
imize the mean performance subject to the constraint 
that the variance not be increased. I think maximizing 
average utility also carries with it the possibility for 
abusing minorities. If it’s wrong for one person to 
jeopardize my health by smoking in my office, then 
it should not be less wrong for two people to smoke 
in my office (of course, there are other options, but 
I’m objecting to the logic that ties morality so closely 
to consensus). It is perhaps a minor quibble but at least 
one piece of advice offered by the author cannot be 
computed. He suggests that the ideal behavior would 
provide ‘the greatest benefit to others in return for the 
least sacrifice to ourselves.’ The problem is that one 
cannot maximize these two functions simultaneously 
and it would seem to require a separate set of principles 
to determine how to weight them. 
Despite these qualms about Baron’s prescriptive 
analysis of moral judgement, his approach does have 
the virtue of consistency. I would much rather have 
a framework to agree or disagree with than a catalog 
of observations devoid of structure. Having said that, 
I wish to turn attention to the framework itself. 
Although the framework that the author uses is suc- 
cessful. I find it somewhat incomplete. What is missing 
or perhaps understated is the analysis of the nature 
and complexity of the task that people face when they 
are thinking and deciding. Frequently, there is an un- 
limited set of information that one could potentially 
search and evaluate. As a result, extensive search is 
an impracticality. The computational complexity prob- 
lem can be nicely illustrated by an example from Chris- 
topher Cherniak’s (1986) book, Minimal Rationality. 
Suppose we have a computer that could evaluate the 
consistency of an assertion in the time that it takes 
a light ray to traverse the diameter of a proton, and 
suppose the computer ran for 20 billion years. Even 
if one had a procedure for doing this it would involve 
so many checks that there still would not be sufficient 
time to evaluate the internal consistency of a belief 
system containing only 138 logically independent prop- 
ositions! 
Given that many decision tasks are unconstrained 
with respect to potentially relevant information, it 
should not be surprising that people often adopt short- 
cut strategies or heuristics that are not optimal but 
which work pretty well most of the time (Herbert Simon 
refers to this as ‘satisficing’ rather than maximizing). 
Robin Hogarth (Psychological Bulletin, 198 I ,  90, 197- 
217) has argued that whether or not a strategy is func- 
tional depends on the conditions under which judge- 
ments are made. Much of the work on heuristics uses 
discrete judgement tasks. However, heuristics that are 
dysfunctional in a discrete task may be effective in con- 
tinuous, interactive judgement tasks. Most of the time, 
Hogarth argues, it is good enough to get things going 
in the right direction with fine tuning being left for 
the future. 
I would have liked to see a more extensive analysis 
of the costs associated with different decision pro- 
cedures. For example, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
(Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 1988,14,534-552) have shown 
through computer simulation that under time con- 
straints, several (nonnormative) heuristics are more 
accurate (and therefore more adaptive) than a trun- 
cated normative procedure. They also observed that 
people adjusted design strategies in response to time 
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pressure in an adaptive manner (where adaptiveness 
is as again defined by computer simulations of the effec- 
tiveness of different strategies under different time 
costs). 
Thinking und Deciding focuses on methods of think- 
ing and mentions content effects only in passing. Again 
It's a matter of emphasis, but one wonders to  what 
extent poor thinking can be attributed to knowledge 
rather than procedure. Mental models may be logically 
constructed but employ inadequate knowledge. as in 
the case of the woman who reasoned that her uterus 
was like a container that opened once a month during 
menstruation and that she would not become pregnant 
if she had intercourse only midway between her periods 
(when the container was safely closed). 
Whether or not Johnson Baron's framework is 
incomplete. it  does succeed in raising a fundamental 
question. Can we develop a coherent notion of good 
and poor thinking that is not so constrained that it 
imposes unrealistic expectations (thus overestimating 
the extent of poor thinking) nor so unconstrained that 
it becomes a vacuous standard (thus defining poor 
thinking out of existence)? Thinking utid Deciding is 
a provocative attempt (in the best sense of the word) 
a t  addressing this issue. 
DOUGLAS L. MEDIN 
Psjdiologj* Depurtmmt. 
L i i i iw~ i t .~~  qf Michfgan, .4nn Arbor, 
Michigun. USA 
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(Eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Cloth. 673 pages. index. 
I n  June 1983 a conference was held at the Harvard 
Business School honoring the School's 75th anniver- 
sary with a gathering of illustrious decision theorists. 
The timing was splendid. as the editors note in their 
Preface to the current volume: .. . . not since the early 
1950s , . . has so much intellectual enthusiasm been dir- 
ected at the question of how people should. and do. 
behave when called upon to take action in the face 
of uncertainty'. Given the setting. the occasion. and 
the distinction of the invited participants. one imagines 
the conference as a feast for the mind. For those unable 
to attend. perhaps the published record m i l l  recapture 
;1 little of the excitement. 
Unfortunately. despite the excellence of many of the 
individual papers reprinted in this volume. not very 
much of the conference spirit survives. First. the edi- 
tors' hope of including edited transcripts of the discus- 
hion tapes encountered '. . . technical and . . . ad- 
ministrative difficulties' (p. 5)  and the transcripts 
were abandoned except for a dozen pages from the 
medical decision making session. reprinted here. 
Second. a good deal has happened in  the area since 
1983. and man)' of the papers have lost some of their 
14x3 freshness. having entered the literature in alterna- 
tive fornms. Third. a substantial fraction of the papers 
were not fresh-minted. even in 1983: of 28 papers 
included here. 1 1 have open-literature publication dates 
o f  1983 or earlier; two more had already been issued 
.:4 HBS Working papers by 1980; and seven more 
reached the open literature between 1984 and 1986. 
lhis  lea\es only eight pieces nominally 'new' for this 
oiumr. including the editors' introductory overview. 
The volume. then. falls somewhat short as hot news 
from the front. 
Where it works surprisingly well. in contrast, is as 
a straightforward collection of excellent - in several 
cases classic - papers. We may not learn much about 
how the conference went. but we cannot miss the bril- 
liance of the cast the organizers assembled, and of the 
papers each chose as a record of his or her participation. 
Indeed. if  one considers the book not as a record of 
a conference but as a candidate text for a graduate 
seminar. i t  would score very highly. as a supplemental 
readings collection if not as the main text. 
To lend some degree of orderliness to the collection, 
the editors have imposed a four-part structure. The 
first. entitled 'Conceptions of Choice', groups together 
nine quite heterogeneous pieces ranging from seminal 
theoretical contributions by Simon, March, Shafer and 
Fishburn to descriptive reviews by Einhorn and 
Hogarth, and Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein. A 
second. surprisingly brief. section includes four papers 
touching on aspects of probability in choice. A third 
section offers seven interestingly varied papers on utili- 
ties and values. including a delightful short paper from 
Schelling ('The Mind as a Consuming Organ'). The 
final section claims to represent applications. but does 
so only in a distant way except for three papers on 
medical decision making by Pauker. McNeil and col- 
leagues. Four other pieces touch on applications in 
economic policy, business organizations, and edu- 
cation. The editors' introduction, in addition to a brave 
effort at covering this riot of diversity in a respectable 
mantle of orderliness. makes the case for adding a third 
category. prescriptive models, to the usual distinction 
between descriptive and normative. The case, though 
only modestly supported in the subsequent papers, is 
a strong one. if only as a reminder to those who would 
leap too swiftly from normative considerations to 
action recommendations that the gap to be closed is 
large. 
